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Since 2005, dozens of Minnesota school districts have implemented pay for perfor-
mance (P4P) plans as part of the state's Quality Compensation (Q-Comp) program.
This paper performs the rst systematic study of Q-Comp's impact on student achieve-
ment, exploiting variation across districts in the timing of participation as well as in the
design of districts' P4P plans to study eects on achievement for grades 3 through 8 on
state-mandated tests. Results show a consistent zero average eect of Q-Comp partici-
pation on both reading and math achievement. However, eects on reading achievement
dier depending on the design of the P4P plan. Specically, districts oering greater
rewards for teacher-level goals experienced large gains in reading (0:09=$1,000 bonus)
while those oering rewards based on school-wide goals or subjective evaluations did
not. Gains from P4P design features were not consistently evident in math or for
measures of parental demand. Drawing on alternative standardized tests available for
some districts suggests that gains are not fully generalizable.
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Many school districts are introducing pay for performance (P4P) plans, using teacher com-
pensation criteria beyond just the conventional years of experience and education. Plans
dier on many dimensions including whether teachers are rewarded individually or in teams,
based on objective targets or subjective evaluations, and the size of incentives. Theory oers
ambiguous guidance on the optimal plan and empirical evidence on the relative and absolute
merit of dierent P4P plans is decidedly mixed. While reviews of the literature point to some
gains from P4P (Podgursky and Springer, 2007; Neal, 2011), evaluations of two large-scale
P4P plans that were implemented as randomized trials found null or even negative eects
(Springer et al., 2010; Fryer, 2011).
In 2005, the State of Minnesota implemented the Quality Compensation program (Q-
Comp) as the signature education initiative of Governor Tim Pawlenty. Q-Comp is a package
of reforms including P4P. The Minnesota Department of Education set general guidelines
for acceptable programs and invited districts to propose specic P4P plans that they would
implement. If the proposal was approved, the state authorized up to $260 per student per
year in additional funding. Q-Comp provides an excellent opportunity to learn about the
merits of dierent kinds of P4P plans for many reasons.
First, districts that participated in Q-Comp designed plans that varied along many di-
mensions. Each district was required to specify the maximum incentive pay they would make
available to teachers based on dierent types of criteria and there is great variation in what
they chose. This allows us to construct continuous measures of each district's P4P plan in
terms of dollars at stake based on: (1) individual teacher-level goals, (2) school-wide goals,
or (3) subjective evaluations. We exploit this variation to provide evidence on the eect of
P4P plan design features on achievement scores and other outcomes. This inquiry speaks
to many issues at the heart of personnel economics, including objective versus subjective
evaluations and individual versus team based incentives. Dixit (2002) urges empirical work
that considers P4P plan heterogeneity and our investigation is certainly in this vein.
1Second, the study has several properties that make non-experimental identication cred-
ible. Six dierent cohorts of districts adopted Q-Comp-funded P4P programs over a six year
period. We exploit this variation in the timing of adoption with a generalized dierence-in-
dierence approach. Further, not every district's application succeeded, which enables some
important checks. Results are stable when analyzing alternative samples: adopters-only,
applicants-only, or all schools in the state.
Third, Q-Comp programs are implemented as permanent changes starting in 2005, which
has advantages. If teacher P4P works, it will do so through two primary mechanisms:
supporting improved eort by incumbent teachers and attracting better potential teachers
to the profession (Lazear, 2003). To operate fully, each mechanism requires an expectation
that P4P is here to stay. Teachers may be less willing to alter behavior in response to a
time-limited experiment or they may need a few years of trial and error to learn what to
do to improve outcomes. And, few people will make career choices based on an incentive
program that is not expected to last. Studying a policy change in the eld increases external
validity because teachers, administrators and families have incentives to adjust to the new
policies.
Fourth, in Minnesota, various measures of education quality | standardized tests and
parent demand | are available. The Minnesota Comprehensive Achievement Test Series
Two (MCA-II) is a state-mandated standardized achievement test. Many districts also use
the Northwest Evaluation Association's Measures of Academic Progress (NWEA). We use
this to assess whether learning gains generalize to multiple assessments. Since test scores
are an imperfect measure of education quality learning and parents may have a richer view
of education quality, we also study eects of P4P programs on parent demand. Minnesota is
an excellent setting for this. It has the nation's longest standing open enrollment legislation
(1981) and charter school legislation (1991). State funding follows the child. Families can
enroll their students in any available district or charter at only the cost of transportation,
which is sometimes subsidized. These options are well known and widely used.
2Lastly, Q-Comp's grantor-grantee structure for program design mirrors U.S. Department
of Eduction eorts such as Race to the Top and the Teacher Incentive Fund. In all these
programs, the funder sets out guidelines and asks local entities to design and propose plans
within them. The grantor delegates some design decisions to take advantage of local knowl-
edge about what will work and what is politically feasible. However, this comes with the risk
that local grantees do not deliver. Q-Comp can provide evidence on the trade-os involved
with this approach.
This study nds that, on average, Q-Comp did not produce gains on any measure. How-
ever, P4P plan design matters and in interesting ways. While the grantor-grantee format
did not lead to widespread improvements in student achievement, it does provide a unique
opportunity to learn about P4P plans in education.
Q-Comp districts that tie performance bonuses to individual teacher-level or small-group
criteria experience increases in average MCA-II reading scores of 0.09 standard deviations per
$1,000 of bonus oered. The nding is quite robust within the limits of our study design and
suggests a very large eect for a relatively low price.1 In contrast, linking rewards to school-
level criteria does not appear to cause increases in reading scores, nor does linking rewards
to a subjective evaluation process. There is weak evidence that higher stakes on subjective
evaluations may lead to declines in reading scores. For math, there are no apparent eects
of the incentives tied to teacher- or school-level measures. In some specications there is
evidence of a negative eect of tying bonuses to subjective evaluations in math as well.
There is evidence that achievement gains are concentrated on, but not completely limited
to, the high-stakes test. While we do not generally observe to which tests districts tie stakes,
we can observe which districts purchase NWEA tests | a necessary condition for tying
stakes to it. In these districts, we observe both MCA-II and NWEA scores. The impacts
1The social value of a 0.2 achievement gain for a teacher's class each year has been recently estimated
conservatively at $200,000 (Hanushek, 2010; Chetty et al., 2010). Our result would imply that a $1,000 bonus
yields an average $90,000 in social value, if the value derives from reading only. There are many program
elements accompanying the P4P reforms. However, this rate of return would be extremely large unless the
other elements have costs that are a couple of orders of magnitude bigger than the direct cost of bonuses.
3of teacher-level bonuses on MCA-II reading scores that we discussed above turn out to be
mostly due to gains realized in districts that do not purchase NWEA tests. The impact
of teacher-level incentives on MCA-II reading scores among districts using the NWEA is
still positive, but of smaller magnitude and not signicant at conventional levels. Turning
to measures of parent demand, districts that put higher stakes on individual teacher-level
criteria do not see an increase in demand. There is weak evidence that students move to
districts that put higher stakes on school-level measures and leave districts that put higher
stakes on subjective evaluations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides more detail on the Q-Comp program.
Section 3 briey reviews relevant theoretical and empirical literature. Section 4 introduces
an empirical model and discusses identication. Section 5 presents results including survey
evidence that Q-Comp's adoption led to real changes in district policies and programs,
evidence on the relative success of dierent P4P plan design features, robustness checks, and
tests for generalizability of the results to alternative outcomes. Lastly we report results on
the average eects of Q-Comp participation. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of how
our results add to the existing literature on P4P and plans for future research.
42 Design of and selection into Q-Comp
2.1 Q-Comp participation
Q-Comp is sizable. Since its inception in 2005, over one million student-years have been
taught in dozens of participating districts and charters and over $200 million of state funds
have been distributed to districts. As one of the nation's largest teacher P4P programs,
Q-Comp has attracted signicant policy and political attention, yet little is known about
the designs of the P4P plans it funds or their eects.2
Selection into Q-Comp works as follows. The state dened guidelines regarding the
content of Q-Comp reform plans and promised additional annual funding to districts that
implement approved plans. Districts (including charters) decide whether to apply and what
specic P4P plans to propose. The state decides whether to accept the proposal. Where
teachers were unionized, teachers vote on whether to accept the proposal.3 Districts that
clear all these hurdles participate in Q-Comp.
New districts have joined the program each year. Table I describes the number of dis-
tricts, schools, and students participating and not participating in Q-Comp each year. The
population is all Minnesota public schools including charters, each constituting its own dis-
trict. In 2005, only eight of the state's 504 districts participated (1.6%). These included 59
of the 2,256 schools with 33,674 of the 838,997 students (4.0%). By the 2009-10 academic
year, 14.1% of districts with 28.6% of students participated. A few participating districts
dropped out of Q-Comp. These tables reect stock given exit and entry ow.4 Most analysis
2Neal (2011) summarizes U.S. and international empirical evaluations of P4P and notes that there has
been no previous independent study of Q-Comp. A legislative auditor's report (Nobels, 2009) and a state-
commissioned external report (Hezel Associates, 2009) provide evidence about Q-Comp's implementation
but very little about resulting student achievement. Neither dealt with selection or covariates. Nadler and
Wiswall (2011) use data on Q-Comp participation but do not address whether Q-Comp (or P4P design in
general) impacts student achievement.
3Almost all Minnesota districts are unionized though many charters are not. Anecdotal evidence suggests
districts informally negotiated proposals with unions in advance and teachers ocially voted to ratify the
contract after state approval.
4Districts' Q-Comp start date is based on the date of the approval letter sent by the state Department
of Education. These dates dier slightly from those in a state's Legislative Auditor's report but results are
robust to alternative coding of the start date.
5will focus on grades 3 to 8 because in these grades all students took both math and reading
MCA-II tests. Participation statistics are provided for schools in this sample in the bottom
panel.
2.2 District P4P Design Features
Data on each Q-Comp district's P4P design are collected primarily from letters sent by the
Minnesota Department of Education to each district upon approval of its Q-Comp applica-
tion. In their applications to the state, districts had to specify the maximum bonus pay each
teacher:
1. is eligible to earn for meeting specied goals for student achievement measured at the
teacher, team, or grade level by formative, summative or standardized tests
2. is eligible to earn for meeting specied goals for student achievement measured school-
wide or district-wide
3. can earn through the teacher evaluation/observation process.
The approval letters detail these agreed-upon features of the plan.5
We create three variables for each district measuring the maximum performance pay
available to teachers for each of the three types of criteria outlined above. We label incentives
under categories 1, 2 and 3 as Teacher P4P$, School P4P$ and Evaluation P4P$, respectively.
A few clarications on the details of each dimension are helpful.
Evaluation P4P$ are incentives tied to receiving a positive evaluation based on classroom
observation. Depending on the district, the evaluator is the principal or other administrator,
a peer, or a hired consultant (sometimes retired teachers). The state encouraged districts to
use the Danielson evaluation framework (Danielson and McGreal, 2000) and conduct at least
three observation sessions per year. Evaluations should be done by a trained evaluator and
5Each letter was coded by 3 independent coders. Our results are robust to dierent interpretations of
vague letters and to dropping districts with vague letters from the analysis.
6involve with pre and post observation conferences. Although the evaluations are \subjective,"
they rely heavily on a rubric and the state stresses the importance of inter-rater reliability,
thus they may be very formalized \subjective" evaluations.
School P4P$ are incentives payable to all sta covered under the collective bargaining
agreement for reaching a set target. These are primarily dened at the school level, with the
exception of few small districts that set a district-wide goal. The goals are almost exclusively
based on standardized test scores but vary on the targeted subject (e.g. math or reading) and
assessment (e.g. MCA-II or NWEA). Most approval letters also specied the subject and
assessment to which districts elected to tie their school-wide performance bonuses. Schools
were more likely to tie School P4P$ to reading than to math achievement. Three times more
school-grades (15.6%) chose to focus exclusively on reading rather than exclusively on math
(4.5%). The remainder divided their attention between math, reading, other, or unspecied
subjects.
Teacher P4P$ are incentives based on quantiable targets dened at the teacher or small
team level. The process of setting these targets was associated with rather signicant comple-
mentary change which the Minnesota Department of Education refers to as \job embedded
professional development." Specically, with the support of their administration, teachers
form Professional Learning Communities (PLCs) and meet regularly to analyze classroom
practice, learn new instructional strategies and tactics, eld-test them in the classroom, and
report the results to each other (Hord and Hirsch, 2008; Darling-Hammond et al., 2009).
Within a PLC, each teacher or small team must specify a target. They are not necessarily
based on standardized test scores (though they can be), but they have to contribute to stated
school-wide goal and have to be quantiable. Data and assessment development teams were
created to assist with the target setting and monitoring for each PLC. These are teams of
teachers who meet together and analyze results for standardized tests or teacher-created
assessments and use the evidence to determine teaching strategies that will improve student
achievement.
7This process is unique in several aspects. First, goals are set locally rather than externally.
This can be eective if PLCs use local information to set goals that are more appropriate
for each teacher. Also, teachers may be more inclined to pursue goals if they are actively
involved in setting them. Perhaps most importantly, an investment was made in creating
an infrastructure to monitor progress towards stated goals and provide support in achieving
them. However, a process of setting goals locally would seem to have a higher risk of being
captured and turned into defacto salary augmentations (Neal, 2011).
Q-Comp districts vary in the total levels of pay available across the three dimensions as
well as the shares available through each dimension. The value of these variables is shared by
all a district's school-grades in post-adoption years. Table III summarizes the cross-sectional
distribution of these measures across participating districts.6 Participating teachers can earn
an average maximum of $872 a year in incentive pay through locally-set, individual or small
team-level goals (Teacher P4P$), an average maximum of $247 for school or district-level
goals (School P4P$), and an average maximum of $1,100 by meeting criteria tied to subjective
evaluations (Evaluation P4P$). Table IV describes how the three dimensions are correlated.
For Teacher P4P$, we observe a 0.12 correlation with School P4P$ and a  0:80 correlation
with Evaluation P4P$, and a  0:15 correlation between School P4P$ and Evaluation P4P$.
Teacher P4P$ and Evaluation P4P$ have a strong negative correlation. Figure I displays
histograms for the marginal distributions of the three variables. The triggers for paying out
on these dimensions are set according to various locally-designed, state-approved criteria
within and across districts.
Figure II displays the joint distribution of Q-Comp districts across P4P design dimen-
sions. Each point represents a district's Q-Comp P4P design. The size of each point rep-
resents the maximum total bonus available to teachers in that district, the sum of Teacher,
6In a few cases, only the share assigned to each dimension and no dollar values were listed in the approval
letter nor in any available program documents. For these, we assumed the modal total amount among
observed districts ($2,000) and applied the observed shares to this. Another ve letters were so ambiguous
as to be impossible to code. Although districts and schools may change their designs over time we assume
they stay constant at the initial levels. A few districts led change forms with the Minnesota Department
of Education. These were small adjustments and they do not change the results reported here.
8School and Evaluation P4P$. Each district's share of awards tied to Teacher P4P$ criteria
is graphed horizontally. The share tied to School P4P$ criteria is graphed vertically. The
remaining share, tied to Evaluation P4P$ criteria, is represented by the distance to the fron-
tier. For instance, the large dot appearing on the frontier represents a district with a plan
oering each teacher over $4,000 in bonus pay annually. Being on the frontier line means
that none of the bonus is tied to subjective evaluation. Half the bonus is tied to Teacher
P4P$ criteria and the other half to School P4P$ criteria. The small dot at the origin repre-
sents a district with a plan that awards between $1,000 and $2,000 based solely on subjective
evaluations.
This gure makes some important points about the Q-Comp designs clear. First, there
is a lot of variation across districts. They do not cluster around some generally known,
optimal contract. Second, almost all districts oer between $1,000 and $4,000 per year in
total P4P$. Third, most districts oer a mix across all three dimensions; few lie on the
edges of the triangle. Fourth, none oer more than half of their bonus to School P4P$
criteria, although there is a lot variation in shares below half. This variation in P4P plan
design underscores our belief that analyzing Q-Comp in the aggregate likely masks important
dierences across districts. Accounting for this heterogeneity in design provides a unique
opportunity to understand how P4P plan specics impact educational outcomes.
3 Literature Review
Perhaps the most important issue facing P4P in education involves whether gains observed
in response to P4P plans are only realized on the rewarded metric or whether these are
generalizable to alternative measures of student learning (Koretz, 2002; Neal, 2011). Gains
in the rewarded metric that are not generalizable to other measures of student achievement
may result from unproductive hidden teacher action in the form of coaching (Jacob, 2005),
socially wasteful gaming (Figlio and Winicki, 2005), or even cheating (Jacob and Levitt,
92003). Since no test score can fully capture teachers' eects on critical thinking, non-cognitive
skills, and other unobserved yet valuable aspects of learning, high powered incentives tied to
test scores may create a multitasking problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992,
2002). Teachers may spend too much time on tested skills at the expense of other socially
valuable skills, leading to \teaching to the test" or a \narrowing of the curriculum."
Adding subjective evaluation criteria may mitigate this problem (Baker et al., 1994).
Subjective evaluations are especially attractive because they can be used in non-tested sub-
jects and research has shown that principals are able to distinguish eective from ineective
teachers (Jacob and Lefgren, 2008; Rocko et al., 2011; Tyler et al., 2010). A recent study of
a high quality teacher evaluation program in Cincinnati found immediate and medium-term
student achievement gains (Taylor and Tyler, 2011). This Cincinnati program attached high-
stakes, the possibility of ring, to the same Danielson framework commonly used among for
Evaluation P4P$ among Q-Comp participants.
However, if principals are reluctant to use their knowledge of teacher eectiveness when
making high-stakes decisions, such programs are subject to capture. Neal (2011) speculates
that the failure of P4P programs in England (Atkinson et al., 2004) and Portugal (Martins,
2009) may be due to the fact that they were largely based on subjective evaluations done
by local sta. Such plans may not improve student achievement because evaluators lack
incentives to assess teachers accurately. Neal asserts, with specic mention of Q-Comp, that
plans which base pay on locally-dened goals and locally-conducted evaluations can become
a \vehicle for raising base pay of most or all teachers whether or not these teachers improve
their performance."7
The theoretical literature on P4P more broadly also recognizes a trade-o between oer-
ing rewards based on individual versus team outcomes. Given complementarities in produc-
7There is evidence that almost all teachers in Q-Comp districts earn at least some performance-based
pay, often through the subjective evaluation portion. (Johns, 2009) found that, in the 22 Q-Comp districts
they researched, only 27 teachers got absolutely no performance payment out of the roughly 4,200 teachers
eligible. However, not everyone earns the maximum evaluation payout nor meets the teacher-centered or
school- or district-level standards based on student achievement. There are incentives unclaimed so this is
not strictly a cash transfer program.
10tion, individual-level incentives can discourage productive cooperation (Alchian and Dem-
setz, 1972). On the other hand, team incentives open the door for free riding, a problem
that worsens in team size. In schools, grade levels are a natural grouping and additionally,
many middle and high schools are organized into even smaller teams of core subject teachers.
These groups may be small enough to exert sucient peer pressure to overcome the free-rider
problem (Kandel and Lazear, 1992).
We contribute empirical evidence to a growing body of studies on eectiveness of P4P in
U.S. schools.8 Neal (2011) thoroughly reviews the literature and concludes that P4P incen-
tives seem able to shift performance targets but the gains are not necessarily generalizable to
other measures of learning. However, two recent experiments nd that P4P failed to move
even the performance targets. First, in a randomized P4P trial in New York City, there were
no positive impacts of school-wide bonuses on student achievement. The New York program
provides rewards to each teacher if the school meets a specied target based on a composite
measure that includes test scores, attendance and discipline. In fact, the school-level bonuses
may even have decreased student achievement (Fryer, 2011). Second, a randomized P4P trial
in Nashville, Tennessee, in which teachers assigned to the treatment group could earn up
to $15,000 based on their individual students' gains on state mathematics tests, found no
signicant treatment eect on student achievement (Springer et al., 2010). Each of these
two studies tested a single P4P design in a time-limited experiment and each found no boost
in achievement on the performance targets.
Q-Comp's structure is based on the Milken Foundation's TAP model. Previous empirical
research on TAP nds a mixed impact on achievement at best. Springer et al. (2008) nd
possible positive eects for elementary grades as measured by growth on NWEA exams but
8There is also a growing literature on P4P outside the U.S. This includes a recent large scale randomized
trial in Andhra Pradesh, India. In this setting individual and small team rewards improve student achieve-
ment. Specically, individual and small group rewards both had a positive impact on language and math
tests with eect sizes between 0.12 to 0.27 standard deviations. In the rst year, individual and small group
rewards were equally eective. In the second year, individual rewards were more eective (Muralidharan
and Sundararaman, 2011). There is also evidence in support of P4P from tournament structured P4P in
Israel (Lavy, 2002, 2009) and school-wide bonuses in Kenya (Glewwe et al., 2010).
11that program eects are negative and statistically signicant for higher grades. Glazerman
and Seifullah (2010) evaluate TAP in Chicago exploiting randomization in the timing of
take-up and nd no impact on student achievement growth as measured by average scores
on the Illinois Standard Achievement Test.
Q-Comp implemented programmatic changes that were intended to complement the P4P.
We focus on P4P because changes in it are most reliably measured but discuss our ndings
within the context of the full reform. Personnel economics has long recognized the importance
of factors beyond compensation. Performance pay may be complemented by delegation of
responsibility, monitoring, evaluation, and training. For instance, Prendergast (2002) argues
that when an agent has local knowledge, such as a teacher's knowledge of the students' in
his or her classroom, P4P should be paired with delegated responsibility. In the case of
Q-Comp, individual teacher or small team-level bonuses were tied to goals set through a
very structured professional development process. This process may be as important as, or
even more important than, the pay increase. Marsden (2010) provides a similar discussion
about P4P in British schools. He argues that P4P works primarily through an emphasis
on goal setting. However, similar to the aforementioned concerns about tying bonuses to
subjective evaluations, management literature is replete with warnings about the potential
for individual goals to be corrupted and captured (Locke and Latham, 2002; Gerhart and
Rynes, 2003).
124 Model and Data
To learn about the impact of Q-Comp on student achievement, we analyze a panel of student
achievement, demographic, and school characteristic data dened at the year-school-grade
level using generalized dierence-in-dierence methods. Our primary achievement measures
are MCA-II average scores in math and reading. Since 2005-06 (coincidentally the rst
year of Q-Comp), these have been mandated for every student in third to eighth grade in
both subjects.9 As mentioned in the introduction, we also use NWEA tests, interdistrict
movements and enrollment data as alternative outcomes.
We study how schools' student achievement changes as their Q-Comp participation
changes. The main outcome is average student achievement on MCA-II tests each aca-
demic year indexed t = 2005;2006;:::2009, in each school indexed s = 1;2:::S, in each tested
grade indexed g = 3;4;:::8, and in either math or reading indexed b 2 fM;Rg.10 NWEA
outcomes are similarly dened and indexed. Interdistrict movements and enrollment are
dened at the district-year level and thus are indexed by t and d = 1;2:::D rather than s, g
and b.
In explaining average student achievement, we use variants of this generalized dierence-
in-dierence model:
ytsgb = gbQtsgb + gbwtsg + sgb + tgb + tsgb (1)
Although most participation decisions are made at the district level, a few large districts
allowed individual schools to participate in the program, so the participation decision was
coded accordingly at the school level. Use of school-grade level data increases precision.
Standard errors adjusted for correlation at the district level are provided throughout.
In order to boost power, our primary results pool across grades 3 to 8 and restrict program
9Prior to 2005, only grades 3, 5 and 7 were tested and on a dierent test, the MCA-I.
10Before third grade, students are not tested. After eighth, tenth graders are tested only in reading and
eleventh graders only in math. Estimated eects for these two series are also available on request. MCA-II
data for the 2010-11 school year is not yet available.
13eects to be the same across grades within subject, gb  b.11 To facilitate pooling, all scores
are normalized to mean zero and standard deviation one across schools within grade-year-
subject.
Interest centers on the eects of Q-Comp participation and of features of the P4P designs
adopted. To allow  to capture the eect of Q-Comp participation on average, we dene
Q as a simple participation dummy. To measure the eects of various P4P design features,
we use dierent denitions of Q. In most cases, we dene Q as a vector measuring Teacher
P4P$, School P4P$, and Evaluation P4P$ interacted with the post-adoption indicator.
To measure the eects of Q, we use two alternative comparison time periods. In speci-
cation (A), the reference category is all years prior to adoption. Specication (B) adds an
indicator for academic years two or more years prior to adoption, 1(2+ pre-adoption). This
conditions on and measures pre-adoption dierences in achievement levels between adopters
and non-adopters. The specication (B) reference category is the single year immediately
prior to adoption (Lovenheim, 2009).
Additionally, we include a variable to indicate district-years where the district once par-
ticipated in Q-Comp but has since dropped out. This only aects a small number of districts.
If the estimated coecient on this is negative it indicates districts do worse after leaving
Q-Comp than they did in the year(s) prior to adoption.
It is worth noting that since our data start in the year that the rst cohort adopted
and that dierent-sized cohorts adopted during each year, there are imbalances in what
data are available to identify various parameters. All observations from more than one year
pre-adoption come from the smaller cohorts of districts that adopted between 2007 and 2010.
Since Q-Comp participation is not randomly assigned, there may be systematic unob-
served dierences between districts that inuence both Q-Comp adoption and our outcomes,
which would bias estimates of program eects. We use four main strategies to guard against
this threat. First, since within any given school and grade, average student achievement may
11Results by grade are available in the appendix Table A2.
14vary over time due to dierences in student cohorts, we condition on a vector of year-school-
grade student demographic characteristics and school-level variables (wtsg). These are listed
in the top panel of Table II, which also provides summary statistics. These characteristics
do not vary across subject, although their coecients gb can.
Second, school-grade-subject xed eects (1sgb) are included to remove time-invariant,
additive unobserved dierences in achievement levels (sgb) between schools. The model
is identied from within-school-grade-subject, across-time variation. Fixed eects for each
year-grade-subject (1tgb) are also included. These terms identify counter-factual year eects
for each grade and subject (tgb). This is a generalization of dierence-in-dierence analysis
that relies on dierences in the timing of adoption across districts to separate time eects
from program eects.12
The model is identied by assuming that program variables (Qtsgb) are uncorrelated with
unobserved inuences (tsgb) conditional on other observables, school-grade xed eects, and
year-grade xed eects,
Cov[Qts;tsgbj(wtsg;1sgb;1tgb)]  0 (2)
Within the restrictions of functional form, this model yields unbiased estimates of program
eects even if selection into Q-Comp is based on stable dierences in achievement levels.
If, for instance, schools with higher achievement levels are more likely to adopt or to adopt
earlier than schools with lower achievement levels, that is not a problem. The crucial as-
sumption is that within-school, time-varying, unobserved inuences on achievement levels
are not systematically related to whether or when a school adopted Q-Comp or the features
of the design it adopted. The estimates of  may be biased if districts select into participa-
tion or design based on uctuations in achievement levels. For example, if a school is more
12The rst dierence is the within-school comparison across time periods. The second dierence is between
the rst-dierences at adopting schools and those at non-adopting schools across the same time period. A
within-school change between any two points in time is evaluated against changes across those same two
years among other schools. With a simple participation dummy, gb, measures the dierence in average
grade-g, subject-b achievement within adopting-schools in the years after adoption compared to the years
prior to adoption conditional on changes in wtsg and the average change experienced across these years by
other schools.
15likely to adopt in a year when levels would rise for other reasons than in a year when they
would fall (perhaps, districts experimenting with Q-Comp are also experimenting with other
reforms), this violates the identifying condition and would bias the estimated program eect
upwards. Also, if administrators were able to forecast future achievement successfully and
designed plans that diered based on these forecasts the dierence-in-dierence estimators
above could produce biased results about the P4P plan features.13
Third, we estimate the models with three dierent comparison groups. We compare the
experience of participants to that of either (1) all other schools in the state, (2) districts that
applied to Q-Comp but failed to adopt, due either to the state rejecting the proposal or their
teachers voting against it,14 and (3) just Q-Comp adopters who have not yet adopted. We
refer to these three samples as the full, interested-only, and adopters-only samples, respec-
tively. Excluding never-appliers from the analysis reduces precision because they contain
information about the eect of observable characteristics (w) and the time eects (). How-
ever, excluding them can reduce bias if they are fundamentally dierent from adopters or
applicants in unobservable, time-varying ways. Also, unlike never-applying districts, inter-
ested non-adopters passed the rst hurdle to participation; they choose to apply. Some even
cleared the second hurdle (state approval). In this sense, interested non-adopters are more
similar to adopters than the never-appliers are. Parameter estimates across all samples are
provided for comparison and results turn out to be very stable.
Figures III and IV present trends in average reading and math achievement levels among
each adoption cohort, the cohort of never-adopters, and among interested non-participants.
There are three points to make about these trends. First, there are dierences in average
achievement levels between cohorts. The never-applied cohort is the largest and hovers just
below state mean achievement throughout the period. The interested non-adopters' scores
13We say \successfully" because if unobservable were simply correlated with application the \interested
only" sample still produces unbiased results. So time-varying unobservables have to be correlated with actual
implementation and/or design of P4P plans upon implementation.
14Failed applications had to be obtained through a Freedom of Information Act to the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Education.
16are just below the never appliers. Among Q-Comp adopters, the 2005 and 2010 cohorts are
most similar to the never-adopters and the interested non-adopters on average. However,
the 2006, 2007, and 2008 adoption cohorts were higher achieving than average. The 2009
adopters are lower achieving on average, around a half to a full standard deviation below the
mean in math and reading. Second, there do not seem to be large dierences in achievement
trends between cohorts, aside from the uctuations in the very small 2009 cohort. Third,
this foreshadows one of our conclusions: the eects of Q-Comp participation appear to be
null on average. Increases in achievement do not seem to follow Q-Comp adoption in the
aggregate.
Lastly, we estimate growth models that condition on lagged achievement. Because stu-
dents move across schools, it would not be possible to get lagged achievement data for ap-
proximately one third of the sample if analysis were conducted at the school-grade-subject
level, therefore growth models are estimated at the district-grade-subject level. At the dis-
trict level we can obtain lagged scores based on all students, adding ~ y(t 1)d(g 1) as a covariate
to explain ytdgb. These specications do not use all the variation across grades and schools
that the above models do but are more robust to omitted time varying variables that aect
Q-Comp adoption, P4P plan design and achievement growth. The results turn out to be
quite similar qualitatively.
175 Results
5.1 Did Q-Comp Change Teacher Pay and Incentives?
We begin by asking whether Q-Comp program adoption actually changed teacher incentives
as advertised. Grant recipients often elicit funds for activities they were already performing.
In that case, our study design would nd null eects. Was this the case with Minnesota
school districts? Drawing on supplemental data, we present three pieces of evidence that
Q-Comp actually did change the way teachers are paid.
First, adopting Q-Comp is signicantly associated with districts starting to reward teach-
ers for excellence, according to an analysis of data from the National Center for Educational
Statistics' Schools and Stang Survey (SASS). The SASS asks districts whether they use any
pay incentives to \reward excellence in teaching." Q-Comp participation is signicantly as-
sociated with switches from \No" before Q-Comp adoption to \Yes" after adoption. Table V
reports on the 55 Minnesota districts sampled in both the 2003-04 and 2007-08 waves of the
SASS. Among districts not participating in Q-Comp at the time of the second SASS survey,
96% report no pay for excellence both before and after Q-Comp started. Among districts
participating in Q-Comp in 2007-08, none reported paying for excellence before Q-Comp
in 2003-04. However, in contrast to the nonparticipants, 58% of participants report paying
for excellence in the post-adoption SASS survey wave. This suggests that, many districts
perceived something programmatic to have changed. The fact that 42% of surveyed Q-Comp
districts still reported no pay for excellence also suggests that not all districts experienced
deep changes or conceptualized Q-Comp in this way.
Second, in order to get more detail on the particular aspects of the P4P plans imple-
mented in Q-Comp schools, we conducted an independent phone survey of district human
resource professionals about their district's pay practices without mention of Q-Comp. It
found that participating districts are vastly dierent from nonparticipants in how they com-
pensate teachers. We obtained data from 92 districts (38% response rate), twenty-one of
18whom participate in Q-Comp. Table VI summarizes our ndings. Among Q-Comp partic-
ipants, 86% report paying for student performance and 90% report paying for subjective
evaluations. In stark contrast, none of the non Q-Comp districts report paying on either
of these dimensions. Participating districts are just as likely to pay for years of experience
and educational credentials as are non-participants. Q-Comp P4P is clearly a supplement
to, rather than a replacement of, traditional compensation criteria.
Lastly, introduction of Q-Comp is associated with a 2.5% increase in average teacher
salaries when we use district log mean teacher pay as a dependent variable in our analysis.
More pay comes in districts oering more Teacher P4P$ and Evaluation P4P$, not School
P4P$.15 This is consistent with an average salary of $55,000 and an average Q-Comp bonus
paid of $1,375 per year per teacher in participating districts.
5.2 Impact of P4P Design
Next, we estimate the impact of program design features on standardized test scores. Ta-
ble VII presents estimates for the eects on MCA-II reading pooled across grades 3-8. As
noted, specication (A) compares scores in post-adoption years to all pre-adoption years.
Specication (B) compares post-adoption years to the single year prior to adopting. All spec-
ications condition on time-varying student demographics, school-grade eects and grade-
year eects. The full sample includes 4,677 school-grades with multiple observations across
years for each. Together they include 1,749,818 tested student-years. Each school-grade-
year-subject observation is weighted by the number of students tested.16
Schools which oer more Teacher P4P$ produce large achievement gains in reading. This
result is consistent across alternative comparison groups. Columns 1 and 2 present estimates
using the full sample, columns 3 and 4 present estimates using only the sample of interested
districts (those that ever applied for Q-Comp), and columns 5 and 6 present estimates
15Detail is in the web appendix Table A1.
16The number of observations is slightly dierent for reading and math because year-school-grade-subject
scores are not released by the state when there are fewer than ten students tested and this varies across
subject.
19using only districts that ever participate in the program at some point. The parameter
estimates are positive and signicant across specications and samples, ranging from 0.087
(0.025) to 0.112 (0.026) per $1,000 at stake. The stability of the results suggest that neither
districts' application decision criteria nor the state's rejection criteria were correlated with
time-varying unobservables.
The parameter estimates on School P4P$ are positive and estimated very imprecisely.
We do not see evidence that school or district-level incentives increase reading test scores.
This could be related to the fact that the average maximum bonus for School P4P$ is quite
low.
Rewards for subjective evaluations (Evaluation P4P$) have a negative and statistically
signicant impact on reading achievement in the full sample. Parameter estimates are slightly
smaller in the interested only and adopters only samples and standard errors are higher so
the results are not statistically signicant at conventional levels. The results suggest that
districts that began attaching larger bonuses to the subjective evaluation process, if anything,
did slightly worse on reading than they did prior to Q-Comp.
We also estimated the eect of P4P on achievement growth rather than on achievement
levels. The results are robust to this alternative specication. These models include lagged
measures of achievement as predictors and, in this specication, district-grade xed eects
pick up dierences in stable growth trends for each grade across districts rather than dier-
ences in levels. Parameter estimates in Table VIII continue to indicate a signicant impact of
Teacher P4P$ on reading scores. School P4P$ are now large and negative but still imprecise.
The estimated impact of Evaluation P4P$ is still negative but no longer signicant.
The estimated impact of these same incentives on math scores is less clear. Estimates
presented in Table IX indicate no statistically signicant eect of Teacher or Evaluation
P4P$ on achievement levels. School P4P$, on the other hand, show a large, marginally
signicant positive eect, but only on the specications that use all pre-adoption years as a
reference and not in those that use the single pre-adoption year and condition on dierences
20in prior years' achievement.17 The district growth models for math, presented in Table X,
indicate patterns more similar to those in reading for the Evaluation P4P$, but not for
Teacher P4P$. Specically, estimates imply a negative Evaluation P4P$ impact on math
scores of similar magnitude to the impact on reading scores.
5.3 Causality and Robustness
Next, we probe concerns about causality more deeply. If Q-Comp had been designed as
an experiment, ideally each district would be randomly assigned the timing of adoption as
well as the dollars at stake in each of the three categories. The program we study departs
from this ideal experiment because the timing is not random but rather is driven by the
district administration. Further, the plan designs are a function of the administration's
preferences and teachers' preferences as represented by the union. Because of these concerns,
we investigate sensitivity to various identication threats.
We begin by examining whether the timing of adoption is systematically related ob-
servable district characteristics using a hazard model of switching from nonparticipation to
participation in Q-Comp next year.18 We nd that charter schools are more likely to adopt
Q-Comp than are traditional public school districts. While interesting, this is no cause for
concern since xed eects deal with time-invariant characteristics such as charter status.
The hazard model also describes time-varying observables associated with adoption. Year-
over-year increases in the share of African American and/or Asian American students, the
share of teachers with Masters degrees, and in parent demand all increase the likelihood of
adoption. So adopting districts tend to be growing and attracting more students of color.
Importantly though, changes in average math and reading scores on the MCA-II do not pre-
dict adoption. We do not nd evidence that changes in student achievement drove Q-Comp
adoption rather than vice-versa.
17The negative, signicant estimate on \2+ yrs pre-adoption" indicates that the Q-Comp schools were
improving math achievement leading up to adoption. Improvement did not continue after adoption.
18Full results are available in web appendix Table A5.
21Because plan design is endogenously chosen by the districts rather than randomly as-
signed, the design feature \eects" really capture the combination of selection into P4P
design and their eects. In order for the positive Teacher P4P$ eect to be explained by
selection, districts able to forecast abnormal upward changes in reading test scores would
have to be more likely to apply and the administration and union would have to be more
likely to agree to load on Teacher P4P$. When gains in test scores are forecast, it seems more
likely to load on School P4P$ that are explicitly tied to test scores and evenly distributed
to all union members, rather than Teacher P4P$, which are subject to negotiation through
PLCs.
To further investigate the time-varying determinants of program design, we predict
Teacher P4P$, School P4P$ and Evaluation P4P$ in a seemingly unrelated regression frame-
work (SUR) using one-year changes in observable district characteristics from the year lead-
ing into the application year. This tests for observable changes that predict adoption of a
particular kind of program design. No patterns emerge.19 Importantly, changes in math and
reading achievement are not correlated with any particular plan design. There is no evi-
dence that trends in MCA-II scores inuenced what type of plan districts enacted. Further,
if changes in unobservables are similarly uncorrelated with design characteristics, then our
identifying assumption is valid.
If the timing of adoption for districts or a particular contract design happens to be
correlated with other unobserved-time varying factors that also aect test scores, estimates
could be biased. To assess this, we estimate the models dropping one adoption cohort each
time (Jackson, 2010). This is useful for at least two reasons. First, identication depends
on variation in the timing of adoption and the assumption that timing is not correlated
with unobserved achievement trends. Dropping cohorts helps clarify if dierent cohorts are
getting dierent eects from their designs. Second, because both the Q-Comp program
and the outcome data start in 2005, no pre-adoption trends are available for the rst two
19Results are in web appendix Table A6.
22cohorts. Dropping each can reveal whether the results generalize to the later cohorts where
pre-trends are available. Table XI reports the results with reading in the top panel and
math in the bottom. The results are generally quite stable though when the biggest cohort,
2006, is dropped, the reading results weaken somewhat and become less precise. However,
the results are qualitatively very similar. For math, the results are qualitatively stable,
although, School P4P$ becomes large and signicant when either the 2006 or 2007 cohorts
are dropped.
To generate evidence about the lack of a mediating role played by student, teacher and
district changes, we estimate the model with alternative sets of conditioning variables (wtsg).
Our primary analysis in Tables VII and IX uses student demographics and total enrollment
at the school-grade-year level. Table XII shows that the results are robust to alternative
conditioning sets. The rst column shows the eect of P4P plan designs excluding student
demographics and grade enrollment. Only xed eects and a pre-trend are included. The
second column reproduces the results from Tables VII and IX for comparison. The third col-
umn adds two teacher variables: average experience and percent with a Masters degree. The
fourth column adds three district administrative variables: general reserve fund balance as
a percent of previous year expenditures, net pupil inter-district movements, and log(average
teacher salaries). All the results are quite stable. If unobservables are correlated with the
P4P design variables similarly to these additional sets of observables, then the identifying
assumption seems valid (Altonji et al., 2005).
These same exercises performed for the growth models produces similarly stable results.
In the web appendix, Table A4 presents the analysis dropping cohorts and Table A3 presents
the analysis with alternative conditioning sets.
Next, we introduce both linear and quadratic district-specic time trends as a check
on the dierence-in-dierence specication (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) and supplement the
data in various ways to help deal with the demands this creates. This allows each district
to follow its own dierent trend and is more general than using the indicator for two or
23more years prior to adoption. Table XIII reports these results, which uctuate somewhat for
reading. The math results are consistently null. The rst column reproduces the baseline full
sample, specication (B), results from Table VII and Table IX for ease of comparison. The
second column introduces district-specic linear trends and the third column adds quadratic
trends. With linear trends, the coecient on Teacher P4P$ for reading falls from 0.087 with
standard error (0.025) to 0.031 (0.026). With more general quadratic trends, it returns to
0.081 (0.035). However, with quadratic trends, the eect of Evaluation P4P$ on reading
becomes positive and signicant. This specication is very demanding given only 5 years of
data, especially since one cannot estimate a pre-adoption trend for early adopters given that
2005 was the rst year of both the outcome and the program.
To explore this further, we take advantage of two longer panels of test data though
neither is complete in other dimensions. First, we bring in two prior years of data from the
MCA-I. Because the MCA-I was given only to those in grades 3, 5, and 7, we focus only
on these grades.20 The results, presented in column 4, are very similar to those in the main
analysis. For reading, the coecient on Teacher P4P$ is 0.094 (0.013) and the coecient
on Evaluation P4P$ is -0.075 (0.026). Here, School P4P$ appear to be positively associated
with reading achievement. Second, NWEA data are available for some districts as far back
as 2002-03. However each district chooses whether to purchase access to the test in any
given year and the numbers have grown each year, so this is an unbalanced, self-selected
panel. As presented in column 5 of Table XIII, results indicate a positive, signicant impact
of Teacher P4P$ on NWEA reading scores, even larger than on the MCA-II.21 The impact of
School P4P$ and Evaluation P4P$ are negative but very imprecisely estimated. As with the
MCA, none of the three plan dimensions appear to have an impact on NWEA math scores.
20We normalize the scores on both tests to mean 0 and standard deviation 1 but concern about whether
these two tests are comparable remains.
21We standardize NWEA scores the same way we did MCA-II, to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1
across schools and within year-grade-subject. However, the sample is dierent. To increase comparability
with the standardized MCA-II scores we have used thus far, we compute the standard deviation of standard-
ized MCA-II scores in the sample of school-grade-years that have NWEA scores available | 0.84 in reading
and 0.85 in math. We then report eects scaled by their reciprocals.
24Analogous estimates to those in columns 4 and 5 which also including quadratic trends yield
very similar results.
5.4 Generalizability and impact on alternative outcomes
It is not clear how to interpret the large positive eects of Teacher P4P$ on MCA-II and
NWEA reading scores in terms of generalizability because, in any district, we do not observe
whether Teacher P4P$ are tied to MCA-II, NWEA, or neither. Teacher P4P$ must be
linked to measurable targets, but this could include teacher designed assessments rather
than standardized tests. These targets are negotiated locally and not reported centrally. If
the gains were being generated in districts that do not tie Teacher P4P$ to the outcome
under study, then the gains would appear to be the result of generalized learning. However,
if the MCA-II gains are being driven by districts tying Teacher P4P$ to MCA-II tests and
the NWEA gains are being driven by those tying Teacher P4P$ to NWEA test, then the
same pattern would appear to be the result of non-generalized learning.
To further investigate this issue, we exploit the fact that NWEA tests are not available in
many district-years. We estimate the impact of P4P plan features on both the MCA-II and
NWEA for district-years with data from both tests as well as the impact of P4P plan design
on the MCA-II for the subset of districts where the NWEA is not available. Table XIV
presents the results. The positive impact of Teacher P4P$ on MCA-II reading tests is
disproportionately concentrated among districts that do not use the NWEA. However, the
estimated impact of Teacher P4P$ on MCA-II scores in districts with the NWEA test is
still positive, although about half the magnitude and estimated imprecisely. This suggests
something intermediate between full and null generalizability.
Next, we turn our attention to measures of achievement other than test scores. Ta-
ble XV shows the eect of dierent P4P plan dimensions on inter-district movement and
log enrollment rates using data back to 2003. Summary statistics are in Table II. Teacher
P4P$ appears to have no eect on enrollment or net student ow, suggesting that parents
25do not respond to the induced achievement gains either because they do not value them
highly or do not know about them. Of course, parent demand may respond to changes in
quality only slowly. School P4P$ has a marginally signicant positive eect on net pupil
movements. Evaluation P4P$ has a negative impact on log enrollment, reinforcing results
from the achievement outcomes.
Lastly, we investigate why the eects do not generalize across reading and math and
nd evidence against one plausible explanation. If a disproportionate number of teachers
are rewarded for reading rather than math goals, this might generate the pattern of positive
impacts from Teacher P4P$ on reading but not math. We investigate this using data on
the subjects to which School P4P$ are tied, which can vary at the school-grade level within
Q-Comp districts. Since teachers are encouraged to link their individual goals to the school-
wide goals, it seems reasonable that Teacher P4P$ would follow the same subject bias as
School P4P$. Table XVI presents additional models using an indicator of whether the subject
in question is the only subject that School P4P$ are tied to: 1(only high stakes goal)tsgb. For
each subject, we estimate the main eect of the three P4P$ dimensions as well as interacting
them with the only-goal indicator. None of the P4P$ dimensions are signicantly more
eective when applied in a high-stakes subject-year-school-grade. These results suggest that
any dierences in the P4P plan design eects between math and reading are not primarily
due to dierences in the incidence of goals set across subjects.
5.5 The Overall Eect of Q-Comp Participation
As discussed in the introduction, recent national eorts to spur education reform follow a
similar general approach as Q-Comp in that they set guidelines and accept proposals from
districts. How did Minnesota's program fare overall with this exible approach? What was
the average eect of the program after six years and over $200 million in state funds? Ta-
ble XVII presents estimated eects of program participation on reading (math) achievement
on the MCA-II pooled across grades 3 to 8 in the upper (lower) panel. Across all samples and
26in both subjects, we see evidence of a null eect. In math, specication (B) reveals evidence
that participating districts may have been already improving in the years prior to adoption.
The omitted category here is the year immediately prior to adoption. Therefore, the -0.074
(0.038) estimated coecient on 1(2+ yrs pre-adoption) implies that adopting districts were
doing worse between four and two years prior to adoption than they were in the year imme-
diately prior to adoption. However, once they adopted, the progress did not continue. Other
analysis shows that Q-Comp participation did not aect parent demand as measured by net
pupil movements or log enrollment.
276 Discussion
Q-Comp P4P incentives tied to criteria dened at the teacher- or small team-level had a
large, robust, positive impact on reading achievement. A 0.09 standard deviations increase in
reading scores for a maximum bonus of $1,000 seems impressively inexpensive. Several factors
unique to Q-Comp could explain why we nd such a sizable eect of Teacher P4P$ on test
scores. First, as noted, the prospective time-horizon for the program could have played a role;
stake holders expected the program to last. Second, the Professional Learning Communities
may be teams of teachers large enough to generate benets from cooperation and small
enough to overcome free rider problems. Third, the fact that teachers have a hand in setting
their targets along with their peers and principal may increase the appropriateness of the
goal and their ability and motivation to attain it. Fourth, there were signicant investments
in management practices built around the bonuses. Teachers were organized into teams,
provided with time to consult, to enter mentoring relationships, to engage in low-stakes
classroom observations, and to analyze student performance on assessments (standardized
and teacher-created). The eects found here come as a result of the entire process involved
in setting and helping teachers reach their targets, not only the $1,000 bonus.
Are these gains in reading strictly a result of hidden teacher action, such as coaching
or teaching to the test? This question is closely related to what sorts of goals teachers set,
which unfortunately we do not observe. If most teachers set goals that are not directly
related to standardized tests then the gains do not result from unproductive hidden action.
The Minnesota Department of Education requires that Teacher P4P$ be available to all sta
covered by the collective bargaining agreement, so teachers that not responsible for teaching
testable grades and/or subjects routinely pick goals that are not based on a standardized test.
We have anecdotal evidence that these teachers often pick goals related to other metrics such
as attendance, discipline and even AP classes (in higher grades). Teachers in tested grades
and/or subjects can pick goals that relate to the MCA-II or NWEA but are not required
to do so. In any, case we believe these teacher-level goals are not almost never based on
28\value-added" statistics since most Minnesota districts do not currently have the capacity
to compute teacher-level value-added. Finally, while the fact that MCA-II gains are found
mostly in districts that don't have access to the NWEA and districts with NWEA access
produce gains in NWEA reading does suggests some hidden action, we nd some suggestive
evidence that there are gains in MCA-II reading even in districts with access to the NWEA,
although these are smaller in magnitude and imprecisely estimated.
We nd no evidence that bonuses tied to larger groups, school- or district-level targets,
led to achievement gains. This is consistent with recent evidence from New York City (Fryer,
2011) and with the idea that free riding may be an important problem for incentives dened
at high levels of aggregation. We caution that our evidence on this point is statistically
imprecise.
Subjective evaluations have been proposed as a potentially important component of P4P
for teachers. This is largely based on studies such as Jacob and Lefgren (2008), Rocko
et al. (2011), and Tyler et al. (2010), which show that evaluations are correlated with value
added measures of teacher quality. We test whether attaching bonuses to evaluations benets
student achievement, while remaining agnostic on whether evaluators are able or are choosing
to distinguish teachers by quality. We nd no evidence that bonuses tied to evaluations result
in improvements in student achievement. If anything, we nd that test scores may decrease
in districts that attach bonuses to subjective evaluations.
The fact that high-stakes evaluations may decrease test scores does not necessarily mean
that they are undesirable. Subjective evaluations may be solving the multitasking problem,
discouraging teachers from teaching to the test. In this case a decline in test scores may
be oset by gains in non-tested aspects of learning. However, our results using measures
of parental demand for education { namely enrollment and net pupil movements { do not
support this interpretation. If tying bonuses to evaluations led teachers to produce more
engaging and desirable lessons, then we might see increases in these alternative measures
of educational quality. We do not. A pessimistic interpretation of the negative eect of
29Evaluation P4P$ is that high stakes evaluations do not elicit productive eort, perhaps
because of the capture issues discussed in Neal (2011). There may even be a dog-and-
pony show eect, where teachers divert eort towards developing observational experiences
evaluators value but that do not benet measured student achievement or parent-assessed
education quality.
Lastly, the experience in Minnesota adds to our understanding of locally-designed edu-
cation reform. The grantor-grantee relationship between education authorities and districts
has advantages because it allows use of local information and experimentation in nding
appropriate, feasible P4P designs. Minnesota's experience suggests that if a granting au-
thority proposes a range of reforms and allows districts to design P4P plans, many districts
(in cooperation with local teachers' unions) will design plans that base rewards largely on
subjective evaluations and this does not seem to benet student achievement. On the other
hand, some districts (in cooperation with their local teachers' unions) will weight rewards
to teacher-level outcomes and this appears benecial, at least for reading achievement.
The fact that, despite large gains in some areas of the program, Minnesota spent $200,000,000
to get a net eect of zero also points out risks associated with too much local control over
the plans. Some plans will operate to extract rents from the state more than to improve
education. State and federal governments can, however, use the ndings from Q-Comp, to
chose more appropriate program guidelines. These ndings suggest encouraging districts to
tie rewards to locally set teacher or small team-level goals supported by PLCs, rather than
school or district level goals or subjective evaluations.
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Table I: District and School Q-Comp Participation by Year
Participants Non-Participants
Year Districts Schools Students Districts Schools Students
All schools
2005-06 8 59 33,674 496 2,197 805,323
2006-07 50 322 183,216 458 1,922 657,346
2007-08 60 397 231,465 456 1,856 606,113
2008-09 70 429 252,716 457 1,786 583,218
2009-10 74 411 239,489 451 1,796 597,141
Schools including at least one grade in 3 to 8
2005-06 7 52 23,131 404 1,511 567,202
2006-07 36 255 129,754 379 1,338 463,862
2007-08 43 309 162,499 379 1,278 462,980
2008-09 52 328 176,870 381 1,258 413,023
2009-10 56 315 166,697 375 1,256 427,549
36Table II: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Student: school-grade-year, weighted by enrollment
Total enrollment 167.8 139.3 1 826 1,826,036
Share male 0.513 0.064 0 1 1,826,036
Share free lunch 0.256 0.202 0 1 1,826,036
Share reduced price 0.083 0.052 0 1 1,826,036
Share special educ. 0.139 0.08 0 1 1,826,036
Share Afr.-American 0.092 0.146 0 1 1,826,036
Share Hispanic 0.063 0.092 0 1 1,826,036
Share Asian-American 0.061 0.099 0 1 1,826,036
Share Native American 0.021 0.075 0 1 1,826,036
Teacher: school-year
% teachers with masters 11.0 13.1 0 92.2 3,373
Mean years of experience 13.3 4.4 0 34.0 3,372
District: district-year
Inter-district ow -0.36 498.6 -11,037 2,599 3,244
General Reserve Fund/Expend. 12.4 10.7 -54.7 174.0 3,199
Log(Average teacher salary) 10.8 0.19 9.2 11.7 3,120
Student and teacher characteristics restricted to grades 3-8 and years 2005-2009.
District characteristics not restricted by grade and include data from 2002-2009.
Table III: Summary statistics for district Q-Comp program design variables measuring max-
imum pay available through each dimension, in thousands of dollars
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Teacher P4P$ 0.872 0.692 0 2.5
School P4P$ 0.247 0.214 0 2.5
Evaluation P4P$ 1.1 0.694 0 2.5
Number of participating districts 77
Note: weighted by numbers of tested students. The 2010-11 cohort included additional
districts but their plans are not coded.
Table IV: Correlation of districts' maximum pay available by dimension, weighted
Teacher P4P$ School P4P$ Evaluation P4P$
Teacher P4P$ 1.00
School P4P$ 0.12 1.00
Evaluation P4P$ -0.80 -0.15 1.00
37Table V: Evidence on change in \Pay for Excellence" among Minnesota districts by Q-Comp
participation status from the Schools and Stang Survey (SASS)
Can teachers earn
extra pay \for excellence"?
District in Q-Comp Districts In 2003-04 No Yes No Yes
in 2007-08 in both waves In 2007-08 No Yes Yes No Total
Yes 12 42% 0% 58% 0% 100%
No 43 96% 2% 0% 2% 100%
Note: only these 55 districts appear in both the 2003-04 and 2007-08 waves of SASS. Q-Comp began in 2005.
Table VI: Evidence on Q-Comp's impact on compensation from author survey in 2010
Districts in Percent of districts paying for: N
Q-Comp in Student Subjective Years of Education
2010-11? Perform. Evaluation Experience Credentials
Yes 86% 90% 95% 95% 21
No 0 % 0% 100% 100% 71
38Table VII: Program design eects on student achievement levels - reading
Sample Full Interested Only Adopters Only
Specication (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
Teacher P4P$ 0.087 0.087 0.096 0.097 0.108 0.112
(0.025) (0.025) (0.03) (0.03) (0.027) (0.026)
School P4P$ 0.036 0.034 0.037 0.033 0.032 0.024
(0.08) (0.08) (0.075) (0.074) (0.077) (0.076)
Evaluation P4P$ -.051 -.051 -.044 -.045 -.035 -.034
(0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
2+ pre-adoption -.007 -.013 -.024
(0.046) (0.047) (0.042)
1(Dropped Q-Comp) -.030 -.032 -.022 -.022 0.0005 0.005
(0.068) (0.069) (0.09) (0.091) (0.094) (0.096)
Enrollment, 1,000s -.174 -.175 -.242 -.249 -.270 -.288
(0.222) (0.224) (0.345) (0.353) (0.355) (0.361)
Share free lunch -1.211 -1.211 -1.304 -1.305 -1.366 -1.367
(0.118) (0.118) (0.156) (0.156) (0.17) (0.169)
Share red. price -.763 -.763 -.693 -.695 -1.052 -1.055
(0.132) (0.131) (0.285) (0.283) (0.325) (0.323)
Share special Ed. -1.855 -1.855 -1.837 -1.837 -1.698 -1.700
(0.099) (0.099) (0.17) (0.17) (0.207) (0.207)
Share Male -.484 -.483 -.391 -.390 -.439 -.437
(0.064) (0.064) (0.106) (0.106) (0.132) (0.132)
Share Afr.-American -1.589 -1.588 -1.815 -1.809 -1.690 -1.671
(0.279) (0.279) (0.166) (0.167) (0.245) (0.242)
Share Hispanic -1.311 -1.311 -1.129 -1.124 -1.191 -1.181
(0.188) (0.188) (0.29) (0.285) (0.315) (0.312)
Share Asian-American -.723 -.721 -.460 -.451 -.456 -.432
(0.291) (0.293) (0.255) (0.266) (0.259) (0.266)
Share Native American -.738 -.738 -1.267 -1.267 -.738 -.741
(0.261) (0.261) (0.38) (0.38) (0.396) (0.399)
School-grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N districts 471 471 134 134 101 101
N school-years 4677 4677 1785 1785 1335 1335
N tested students 1749818 1749818 755801 755801 607067 607067
Adj. R2 0.886 0.886 0.916 0.916 0.91 0.91
Coecient (within-district-correlation corrected SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
The single year immediately prior to adoption is always omitted.
39Table VIII: Program design eects on student achievement growth - reading
DV: Reading average achievement for district-grade-year
Sample Full Interested Only Adopters Only
Specication (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
Teacher P4P$ 0.074 0.073 0.083 0.081 0.081 0.076
(0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.04) (0.036)
School P4P$ -.128 -.121 -.163 -.153 -.126 -.115
(0.106) (0.103) (0.108) (0.104) (0.107) (0.101)
Evaluation P4P$ -.030 -.028 -.029 -.027 -.028 -.027
(0.033) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041) (0.038) (0.039)
Lagged reading 0.309 0.309 0.281 0.282 0.291 0.292
(0.02) (0.02) (0.037) (0.038) (0.035) (0.036)
Lagged math 0.143 0.143 0.161 0.16 0.149 0.148
(0.016) (0.016) (0.031) (0.03) (0.035) (0.034)
2+ pre-adoption 0.02 0.031 0.033
(0.051) (0.046) (0.049)
Student observables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N districts 446 446 132 132 98 98
N school-years 1989 1989 584 584 442 442
N students 1339042 1339042 578414 578414 446951 446951
Adjusted R2 0.914 0.914 0.947 0.947 0.932 0.932
Coecient (within-district SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Variables are year-district-grade averages. Lags are prior year, prior grade (t 1)d(g  1)b. Data are pooled
across grades 3 to 8 and academic years 2005-06 to 2009-10. An indicator, 1(Dropped Q-Comp), as well as
district-grade demographic controls are included as in Table VII but not reported.
40Table IX: Program design eects on student achievement levels - math
Sample Full Interested Only Adopters Only
Specication (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
Teacher P4P$ -.031 -.028 -.040 -.033 -.049 -.039
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
School P4P$ 0.182 0.157 0.195 0.169 0.187 0.166
(0.107) (0.11) (0.107) (0.11) (0.108) (0.109)
Evaluation P4P$ -.005 -.011 -.006 -.009 -.015 -.015
(0.022) (0.02) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
2+ pre-adoption -.065 -.070 -.061
(0.039) (0.038) (0.041)
1(Dropped Q-Comp) 0.046 0.033 0.052 0.052 0.016 0.027
(0.111) (0.111) (0.125) (0.122) (0.115) (0.113)
Enrollment, 1,000s -.952 -.964 -.958 -1.000 -1.060 -1.106
(0.386) (0.385) (0.573) (0.571) (0.607) (0.605)
Share free lunch -1.077 -1.079 -1.166 -1.168 -1.262 -1.263
(0.135) (0.135) (0.207) (0.208) (0.249) (0.249)
Share red. price -.547 -.549 -.675 -.683 -1.039 -1.044
(0.139) (0.139) (0.317) (0.316) (0.365) (0.367)
Share special Ed. -1.907 -1.909 -2.041 -2.046 -1.840 -1.848
(0.122) (0.122) (0.222) (0.221) (0.235) (0.233)
Share Male -.008 -.007 0.146 0.15 0.118 0.122
(0.078) (0.078) (0.146) (0.145) (0.175) (0.174)
Share Afr.-American -1.653 -1.643 -2.051 -2.021 -1.940 -1.892
(0.346) (0.347) (0.206) (0.212) (0.299) (0.308)
Share Hispanic -.892 -.887 -.715 -.686 -.556 -.530
(0.17) (0.17) (0.248) (0.251) (0.285) (0.288)
Share Asian-American 0.16 0.179 0.265 0.313 0.16 0.224
(0.226) (0.228) (0.303) (0.304) (0.285) (0.284)
Share Native American -.691 -.690 -1.198 -1.198 -.613 -.625
(0.263) (0.263) (0.399) (0.397) (0.383) (0.386)
School-grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N districts 469 469 134 134 101 101
N school-years 4666 4666 1779 1779 1329 1329
N tested students 1698331 1698331 729520 729520 586667 586667
Adj. R2 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.884 0.884
Coecient (within-district-correlation corrected SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
The single year immediately prior to adoption is always omitted.
41Table X: Program design eects on student achievement growth - math
DV: Math average achievement for district-grade-year
Sample Full Interested Only Adopters Only
Specication (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
Teacher P4P$ 0.019 0.02 0.004 0.007 -.006 -.002
(0.039) (0.04) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.04)
School P4P$ 0.042 0.028 0.059 0.046 0.066 0.057
(0.125) (0.129) (0.122) (0.126) (0.123) (0.126)
Evaluation P4P$ -.032 -.036 -.041 -.044 -.049 -.049
(0.016) (0.016) (0.02) (0.019) (0.02) (0.02)
Lagged reading 0.164 0.164 0.167 0.166 0.163 0.162
(0.017) (0.017) (0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.041)
Lagged math 0.344 0.345 0.36 0.361 0.368 0.369
(0.016) (0.016) (0.03) (0.03) (0.035) (0.035)
2+ pre-adoption -.041 -.040 -.026
(0.032) (0.034) (0.034)
Student observables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N districts 445 445 132 132 98 98
N school-years 1985 1985 584 584 442 442
N students 1295202 1295202 556746 556746 433988 433988
Adjusted R2 0.9 0.9 0.936 0.936 0.924 0.924
Coecient (within-district SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Variables are year-district-grade averages. Lags are prior year, prior grade (t 1)d(g  1)b. Data are pooled
across grades 3 to 8 and academic years 2005-06 to 2009-10. An indicator, 1(Dropped Q-Comp), as well as
district-grade demographic controls are included as in Table IX but not reported.
42Table XI: Robustness to dropping any Q-Comp adoption cohort
Adoption cohort excluded from analysis:
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Reading
Teacher P4P$ 0.108 0.054 0.08 0.088 0.087 0.087
(0.03) (0.046) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
School P4P$ -.056 0.085 0.12 -.005 0.035 0.039
(0.09) (0.083) (0.078) (0.088) (0.08) (0.08)
Evaluation P4P$ -.053 -.038 -.074 -.041 -.052 -.049
(0.023) (0.031) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
2+ pre-adoption -.010 0.0003 -.042 0.002 -.006 0.007
(0.047) (0.056) (0.046) (0.052) (0.047) (0.054)
N districts 464 432 462 461 465 443
N district grades 4509 4041 4475 4591 4637 4474
N tested students 1680075 1428053 1638260 1700066 1743176 1702211
Adj. R2 0.886 0.881 0.883 0.884 0.886 0.887
Math
Teacher P4P$ 0.002 -.080 -.037 -.026 -.029 -.028
(0.032) (0.063) (0.03) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
School P4P$ 0.048 0.217 0.259 0.137 0.16 0.16
(0.099) (0.131) (0.139) (0.12) (0.111) (0.111)
Evaluation P4P$ -.007 -.010 -.029 -.003 -.011 -.010
(0.02) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.02) (0.02)
2+ pre-adoption -.071 -.067 -.068 -.064 -.065 -.061
(0.04) (0.038) (0.05) (0.046) (0.041) (0.044)
N districts 462 430 460 459 463 441
N district grades 4498 4034 4466 4580 4626 4463
N tested students 1631582 1386350 1591116 1650008 1691809 1652454
Adj. R2 0.86 0.853 0.856 0.857 0.858 0.86
Coecient (within-district SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Reading (math) analogous to column 2 of Table VII (IX), except for exclusion of adoption cohorts. Data
are pooled across grades 3 to 8 and academic years 2005-06 to 2009-10.
43Table XII: Robustness to alternative conditioning sets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reading
Teacher P4P$ 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.092
(0.03) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027)
School P4P$ 0.03 0.034 0.035 0.001
(0.074) (0.08) (0.078) (0.104)
Evaluation P4P$ -.067 -.051 -.051 -.059
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028)
2+ pre-adoption -.015 -.007 -.006 0.003
(0.048) (0.046) (0.046) (0.055)
N districts 471 471 471 436
N district grades 4677 4677 4670 4439
N tested students 1749818 1749818 1749080 1384099
Adj. R2 0.873 0.886 0.886 0.893
Math
Teacher P4P$ -.025 -.028 -.028 -.013
(0.038) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
School P4P$ 0.131 0.157 0.159 0.122
(0.106) (0.11) (0.109) (0.119)
Evaluation P4P$ -.017 -.011 -.011 -.002
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
2+ pre-adoption -.063 -.065 -.062 -.056
(0.041) (0.039) (0.04) (0.046)
N districts 469 469 469 434
N district grades 4666 4666 4659 4420
N tested students 1698331 1698331 1697597 1347064
Adj. R2 0.848 0.86 0.859 0.873
Student observables No Yes Yes Yes
Teacher observables No No Yes Yes
District observable No No No Yes
District-grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coecient (within-district SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Reading (math) analogous to column 2 of Table VII (IX), except for changes in covariate sets. Data are
pooled across grades 3 to 8 and academic years 2005-06 to 2009-10.
44Table XIII: Robustness to the inclusion of district-specic time trends
Specication 1 2 3 4 5
Reading
Teacher P4P$ 0.087 0.031 0.081 0.094 0.320
(0.025) (0.026) (0.035) (0.013) (0.140)
School P4P$ 0.034 0.114 -.148 0.184 -0.290
(0.08) (0.09) (0.145) (0.089) (0.339)
Evaluation P4P$ -.051 -.043 0.086 -.075 -0.135
(0.023) (0.04) (0.038) (0.026) (0.105)
N districts 471 471 471 463 343
N district-grades 4677 4677 4677 2530 3237
N tested students 1749818 1749818 1749818 1230784 689109
Adj. R2 0.886 0.896 0.902 0.881 0.715
Math
Teacher P4P$ -.028 0.01 0.039 -.005 .047
(0.031) (0.027) (0.052) (0.025) (0.109)
School P4P$ 0.157 -.053 0.005 0.068 0.122
(0.11) (0.116) (0.153) (0.106) (0.289)
Evaluation P4P$ -.011 0.022 0.031 0.044 0.062
(0.02) (0.02) (0.049) (0.035) (0.078)
N districts 469 469 469 461 344
N district-grades 4666 4666 4666 2528 3228
N tested students 1698331 1698331 1698331 1204226 690676
Adj. R2 0.86 0.873 0.88 0.852 0.746
Includes:
1(2+ pre-adoption) Y N N N N
District-specic trend N Linear Quadratic Linear Linear
Sample includes:
Test MCA-II MCA-II MCA-II MCA/MCA-II NWEA
Years '05-'09 '05-'09 '05-'09 '03-'09 '02-'09
Grades 3-8 3-8 3-8 3, 5, & 7 3-8
Coecient (within-district-correlation corrected SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Student observables, year-grade and school-grade xed eects always included. Specication 1
reproduces Table VII (IX) Full-B result for reading (math). While 2005-2009 outcomes are
normalized MCA-II scores, the 2003 and 2004 outcomes are normalized MCA.
45Table XIV: Program design eects by test and alternate test availability
District-years with NWEA scores District-years without NWEA scores
Test: MCA NWEA MCA NWEA
Reading
Teacher P4P$ 0.053 0.266 0.099 Scores
(0.058) (0.163) (0.028) do
School P4P$ 0.077 -.251 -.079 not
(0.14) (0.296) (0.11) exist
Evaluation P4P$ -.033 -.021 -.041
(0.029) (0.123) (0.035)
2+ pre-adoption 0.007 0.020 -.034
(0.071) (0.072) (0.054)
N districts 334 334 447
N school-grades 2,990 2,990 3,487
N student-years 951,452 497,265 798,366
Adj. R2 0.876 0.698 0.915
Math
Teacher P4P$ -.047 -0.070 -.008
(0.057) (0.160) (0.028)
School P4P$ 0.297 0.331 -.028
(0.133) (0.300) (0.121)
Evaluation P4P$ -.023 0.085 0.023
(0.028) (0.041) (0.025)
2+ pre-adoption -.051 0.061 -.048
(0.041) (0.064) (0.042)
N districts 333 333 444
N school-grades 2,968 2,968 3,481
N student-years 928,817 496,742 769,514
Adj. R2 0.857 0.74 0.893
46Table XV: Program design eects on alternative outcomes
Log Inter-district
(Enrollment) net ow
Teacher P4P$ -.0009 -30.62
(0.032) (45.83)
School P4P$ 0.149 133.70
(0.094) (69.62)
Evaluation P4P$ -.060 -15.59
(0.021) (21.49)
2+ pre-adoption -.096 -51.99
(0.028) (14.83)
N districts 558 516
N district-years 3974 3244
Adj R2 0.986 0.934
Coecient (within-district SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Data is district-year level. Year eects and district eects included.
Includes academic years from 2003-2004 to 2009-2010 and all grades (K-12)
Student characteristics included as in Table VII and Table IX but not reported.
Table XVI: Allowing for dierential eects by whether School P4P$ are tied to student
achievement exclusively in a single subject
Dep. Variable: Reading Math
Teacher P4P $ 0.077 -.029
(0.029) (0.033)
1(Goal for this subject only)  Teacher P4P$ 0.026 -.046
(0.063) (0.073)
School P4P$ 0.01 0.158
(0.08) (0.112)
1(Goal for this subject only)  School P4P$ 0.101 0.326
(0.248) (0.506)
Evaluation P4P$ -.041 -.018
(0.025) (0.022)
1(Goal for this subject only)  Evaluation P4P$ -.047 0.074
(0.031) (0.084)
2+ pre-adoption -.003 -.066
(0.047) (0.04)
N districts 471 469
N school-grades 4,677 4,666
N tested students 1749818 1698331
Adj. R2 0.887 0.86
Coecient (within-district SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Each column is a separate regression of specication B in full sample as in second column of Tables VII and IX.
47Table XVII: Participation eects on achievement levels
Sample Full Interested Only Adopters Only
Specication (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
Reading
Post-adoption 0.016 0.001 0.014 0.006 -.004 -.004
(0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035)
2+ yrs. pre-adoption 0.013 0.011 0.004
(0.054) (0.057) (0.055)
N districts 471 471 134 134 101 101
N school-grade-years 4677 4677 1785 1785 1335 1335
N tested students 1749818 1749818 755801 755801 607067 607067
Adj. R2 0.886 0.886 0.915 0.915 0.909 0.909
Math
Post-adoption 0.016 0.001 0.014 0.006 -.004 -.004
(0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035)
2+ yrs. pre-adoption -.074 -.081 -.073
(0.038) (0.037) (0.04)
N districts 469 469 134 134 101 101
N school-grade-years 4666 4666 1779 1779 1329 1329
N tested students 1698331 1698331 729520 729520 586667 586667
Adj. R2 0.859 0.859 0.89 0.89 0.883 0.884
Coecient (within-district SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Specication as in Table VII and Table IX, except 1(Post-adoption)tsg substituted for the three P4P$ variables.
The single year immediately prior to adoption is always omitted.
488 Figures
Figure I: Marginal frequencies of P4P design variables across Q-Comp districts, in $1,000
49Figure II: Joint distribution of P4P designs across Q-Comp districts
50Figure III: Trend in average reading achievement by Q-Comp adoption cohort
51Figure IV: Trend in average math achievement by Q-Comp adoption cohort
52A Web Appendix














Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Coecient (within-district SE). Year eects and district eects included. All use district-level
variables, except enrollment (district-grade).
53Table 2: Heterogeneous eects by grade-subject
Grade: 3 4 5 6 7 8
Reading
Teacher P4P$ 0.093 -.020 0.038 0.061 0.165 0.186
(0.047) (0.03) (0.023) (0.072) (0.039) (0.06)
School P4P$ 0.108 0.217 0.015 -.083 0.113 -.153
(0.138) (0.087) (0.102) (0.226) (0.11) (0.205)
Evaluation P4P$ -.067 -.069 -.049 -.050 -.113 0.032
(0.039) (0.025) (0.039) (0.04) (0.04) (0.044)
2+ pre-adoption 0.02 0.026 -.042 0.112 -.133 -.038
(0.075) (0.051) (0.06) (0.1) (0.068) (0.078)
Math
Teacher P4P$ -.035 -.045 -.103 -.024 -.023 0.066
(0.037) (0.049) (0.034) (0.073) (0.048) (0.053)
School P4P$ 0.226 0.2 0.052 -.020 0.288 0.211
(0.12) (0.149) (0.139) (0.193) (0.202) (0.224)
Evaluation P4P$ -.067 -.069 -.049 -.050 -.113 0.032
(0.039) (0.025) (0.039) (0.04) (0.04) (0.044)
2+ pre-adoption -.123 -.037 -.034 -.006 -.146 -.053
(0.055) (0.053) (0.095) (0.067) (0.063) (0.093)
Coecient (within-district SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
In each sample, estimates from a single regression with separate eects by grade
from specication B in full sample as in second column of Tables VII and IX.
54Table 3: Robustness of growth model to alternative conditioning sets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reading
Teacher P4P$ 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.098
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.042)
School P4P$ -.092 -.121 -.114 -.243
(0.093) (0.103) (0.102) (0.132)
Evaluation P4P$ -.032 -.028 -.030 -.033
(0.032) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
2+ pre-adoption 0.013 0.02 0.021 0.03
(0.054) (0.051) (0.051) (0.07)
N districts 446 446 446 415
N district grades 1989 1989 1987 1890
N tested students 1339042 1339042 1338696 1038698
Adj. R2 0.91 0.914 0.914 0.92
Math
Teacher P4P$ 0.021 0.02 0.02 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.031)
School P4P$ 0.024 0.028 0.027 -.113
(0.125) (0.129) (0.13) (0.115)
Evaluation P4P$ -.037 -.036 -.037 -.037
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
2+ pre-adoption -.043 -.041 -.042 -.035
(0.03) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
N districts 445 445 445 415
N district grades 1985 1985 1983 1886
N tested students 1295202 1295202 1294863 1005407
Adj. R2 0.899 0.9 0.9 0.911
Student observables No Yes Yes Yes
Teacher observables No No Yes Yes
District observable No No No Yes
District-grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coecient (within-district SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Reading (math) analogous to column 2 of Table VIII (X), except for changes in
covariate sets.
55Table 4: Robustness of growth model to dropping any adoption cohort
Adoption cohort excluded from analysis:
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Reading
Teacher P4P$ 0.121 0.03 0.068 0.071 0.074 0.072
(0.043) (0.049) (0.033) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
School P4P$ -.302 -.096 -.008 -.125 -.118 -.111
(0.124) (0.074) (0.108) (0.115) (0.106) (0.102)
Evaluation P4P$ -.025 0.019 -.071 -.024 -.028 -.026
(0.037) (0.033) (0.032) (0.04) (0.038) (0.039)
2+ pre-adoption 0.011 0.04 -.0009 0.003 0.023 0.04
(0.053) (0.059) (0.039) (0.063) (0.052) (0.066)
N districts 439 407 438 436 440 419
N district grades 1954 1808 1951 1942 1962 1877
N tested students 1292480 1094541 1257031 1301639 1335331 1306279
Adj. R2 0.914 0.907 0.911 0.91 0.914 0.914
Math
Teacher P4P$ 0.085 -.055 0.01 0.02 0.019 0.019
(0.035) (0.06) (0.039) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
School P4P$ -.194 0.134 0.057 0.072 0.041 0.032
(0.122) (0.112) (0.159) (0.138) (0.13) (0.129)
Evaluation P4P$ -.030 -.016 -.045 -.044 -.036 -.036
(0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
2+ pre-adoption -.054 -.032 -.031 -.063 -.039 -.037
(0.032) (0.036) (0.043) (0.036) (0.032) (0.034)
N districts 438 406 437 435 439 418
N district grades 1950 1804 1947 1938 1958 1873
N tested students 1249991 1058062 1215480 1258601 1291574 1263516
Adj. R2 0.901 0.89 0.897 0.897 0.9 0.901
Coecient (within-district SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Reading (math) analogous to column 2 of Table VIII (X), except for exclusion of adoption cohorts.
56Table 5: Proportional hazard model for Q-Comp adoption
DV: 1(start Q-Comp next year)
Predictors Coecient (SE)
Time-varying
Average math score 1.061 (0.048)
Average reading score 0.968 (0.043)
Total enrollment 1.014 (0.006)
Percent free lunch 0.756 (0.158)
Percent red. price lunch 1.811 (0.849)
Percent special education 0.581 (0.348)
Percent male 1.443 (0.502)
Percent Afr.-American 1.313 (0.240)
Percent Hispanic 0.988 (0.322)
Percent Asian-American 1.399 (0.255)
Percent Native American 1.402 (0.395)
Teachers average years experience 0.998 (0.009)
Percent of teachers with Masters 1.011 (0.003)
Log(Mean teacher salary) 0.911 (0.134)
Net interdistrict ow, thousands 1.309 (0.115)
Reserve Fund/Expenditure 0.997 (0.002)
Time-invariant
1(Charter) 3.108 (1.644)
Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
57Table 6: Test of relationship between program design and changes in district observables
leading into the application year
DVs: Teacher P4P$ School P4P$ Evaluation P4P$
 average math achievement -0.136 -0.111 -0.036
(0.183) (0.079) (0.187)
 average reading achievement 0.107 0.015 -0.058
(0.158) (0.068) (0.162)
 student enrollment (1,000) 0.977 0.580 -0.809
(0.642) (0.278) (0.658)
 percent free lunch 2.387 -0.598 2.339
(1.597) (0.691) (1.639)
 percent reduced price lunch 1.069 -0.374 1.564
(2.754) (1.192) (2.826)
 percent special education 3.250 2.370 0.975
(3.209) (1.389) (3.293)
 percent male -6.583 1.109 -1.589
(3.254) (1.408) (3.339)
 percent Afr.-American -4.051 -0.021 1.212
(3.962) (1.715) (4.066)
 percent Hispanic -7.933 0.001 -1.373
(5.565) (2.409) (5.711)
 percent Asian-American -5.704 1.451 13.428
(6.399) (2.770) (6.567)
 percent Native American -3.862 8.902 -36.192
(12.997) (5.626) (13.337)
 General Fund/Expenditures 0.020 0.008 -0.006
(0.016) (0.007) (0.017)
 Log(Mean teacher salary) 0.034 0.450 -0.023
(0.727) (0.315) (0.746)
 Net interdistrict ow -0.004 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.874 0.322 0.865
(0.079) (0.034) (0.081)
N districts 69 69 69
P-value of joint null test .16 .21 .23
Coecient (SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Estimated by SUR. For district-d adopting Q-Comp in year t, xd  xd;t 1   xd;t 2.
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